Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights
Volume 6 | Issue 3

Article 2

Summer 2008

International Criminal Tribunals: A Review of 2007
William A. Schabas

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr
Recommended Citation
William A. Schabas, International Criminal Tribunals: A Review of 2007, 6 Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 382 (2008).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol6/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

Copyright 2008 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights

Volume 6, Issue 3 (Spring 2008)

International Criminal Tribunals: A
Review of 2007
William A. Schabas*
¶1

In its modern incarnation, international criminal justice
might be said to be now about fourteen years old. Following the
bold experiments at Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second World
War, it went into a prolonged slumber, awakened in the early
1990s by the new political climate that emerged as the Cold War
came to an end. In 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) was established by the United
Nations Security Council. A year later, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR” or “Rwanda Tribunal”) was created.
In 2002, the United Nations established its third ad hoc tribunal,
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”).1 The same year, the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered into
force.2 The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was fully operational within a year. A fourth United Nations criminal court, the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, was authorized by the Security
Council in 2007,3 but no trials took place during the year. In parallel to the activities of these new international institutions, national
and so-called ‘hybrid’ courts4 also made their own contributions to
the growing corpus of international criminal case law.
*

OC, MRIA, Professor of Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland,
Galway and Director, Irish Centre for Human Rights; Global Legal Scholar,
University of Warwick School of Law; Visiting Professor, Queen’s University
Belfast School of Law; Visiting Professor, LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome
(2008).
1
On the ad hoc tribunals generally, see William A. Schabas, THE UN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA,
AND SIERRA LEONE (2006).
2
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome
Statute]. See William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (3rd ed. 2007).
3
See S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007).
4
For the distinction between ‘international’ and ‘hybrid’ tribunals, see The Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Postconflict Societies – Report of the Security-General, delivered to the Security
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During 2007, the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda were in the advanced stages of their ‘completion
strategy.’ Major cases were underway, with an ambitious target: to
conclude trials at first instance by the end of 2008. Each tribunal
had a big question mark about future priorities. The ICTY has yet
to apprehend two of its most important suspects, Radovan
Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. They were the object of special confirmation hearings when the Tribunal was at its very beginnings, in
1996,5 but have never been captured. The Rwanda Tribunal also
awaited an important suspect, the alleged banker of the 1994 genocide, Félicien Kabuga, believed to be at large in Kenya. The
Prosecutor provided no clarification about the possibility of prosecution of individuals associated with the Rwandese Patriotic Front,
a matter that has been under consideration for many years. The
Special Court for Sierra Leone completed its three multi-defendant
trials, and prepared to begin what will be its final trial, of former
Liberian president Charles Taylor. As for the International Criminal Court, it was readying for its very first trial, of Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo (“Lubanga”), who has been charged with war
crimes related to the recruitment of child soldiers in eastern Congo.
This article will provide an overview of some of the
highlights of the case law of the tribunals during 2007. The volume of material is enormous, and any attempt to be comprehensive
will stumble on superficiality. Necessarily, then, this review article focuses on only some of the major issues.
Council, ¶¶ 40, 45, 46, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004). See also Laura
A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 295 (2003)
(“Such courts are ‘hybrid’ because both the institutional apparatus and the applicable law consist of a blend of the international and the domestic. Foreign
judges sit alongside their domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and defended by teams of local lawyers working with those from other countries. The
judges apply domestic law that has been reformed to accord with international
standards.”). On the hybrid courts, see also Daryl A. Mundis, New Mechanisms
for the Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 934
(2001); NEW APPROACHES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: KOSOVO,
EAST TIMOR, SIERRA LEONE AND CAMBODIA (Kai Ambos & Mohamed Othman
eds., 2003); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial
Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 709 (1999);
David Turns, “Internationalized” or Ad Hoc Justice for International Criminal
Law in a Time of Transition: The Cases of East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone
and Cambodia, 6 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 123 (2001).
5
Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-R61 & IT-95-18-R61,
Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (Trial Chamber I, July 11, 1996).
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I. GENOCIDE, SREBRENICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE
¶4

¶5

Arguably the most important judicial decision during the
year in the field of international criminal law was the work of the
International Court of Justice, and not one of the international
criminal tribunals. On February 26, 2007, the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, issued a seminal ruling on the crime of genocide. Its judgment concluded litigation that had begun in 1993, when newly-independent
Bosnia sued what was then called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and what had become, by the time of the 2007 decision, Serbia.6 The Court addressed a number of important interpretative
problems with respect to provisions of the 1948 Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.7 It adopted
a relatively conservative interpretation of the definition of the
crime, and rejected the suggestion that ‘ethnic cleansing,’ ‘cultural
genocide’ and forms of attack and persecution directed at ethnic
groups falling short of physical destruction are comprised within
the concept.8
The International Court of Justice placed great reliance on
the factual and legal findings of the ICTY. In effect, it treated the
ad hoc Tribunal as a specialised and authoritative jurisdiction
whose conclusions, within its area of expertise, were to be accorded great deference. The Court reaffirmed its earlier jurispru6

Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. General List No. 91 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter
Bosnia v. Serbia]. See also Antonio Cassese, On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Determining State Responsibility for Genocide, 5J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
875 (2007); Orna Ben-Naftali & Miri Sharon, What the ICJ did not say about
the Duty to Punish Genocide: The Missing Pieces in a Puzzle, 5 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 859 (2007); Paola Gaeta, Génocide d’État et responsabilité pénale individuelle, 111 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 272 (2007);
Andrew B. Loewenstein & Stephen A. Kostas, Divergent Approaches to Determining Responsibility for Genocide: The Darfur Commission of Inquiry and the
ICJ’s Judgment in the Genocide Case, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 839 (2007); William A. Schabas, Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a
Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes, 2 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 101
(2007); William A. Schabas, Whither Genocide? The International Court of
Justice Finally Pronounces, 9 J. GENOCIDE RES. 183 (2007); Christian Tomuschat, Reparation in Cases of Genocide, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 905 (2007).
7
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
8
Bosnia v. Serbia, supra note 6, ¶ 190.
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dence with respect to the ‘direct control’ test over paramilitary
units,9 an issue that had been challenged in case law of the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY.10 The judgment also endorsed an ambitious
interpretative approach to the duty to prevent genocide.11 Its insistence that the Convention imposes an obligation upon states to prevent genocide even when it occurs outside their own borders, to the
extent that they are in a position of influence, and that they act
within the confines of the Charter of the United Nations, dovetails
very neatly with the emerging doctrine of the responsibility to protect.12
The influence of the International Court of Justice ruling in
Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia was felt almost immediately by
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, which reversed its conviction
of Vidoje Blagojević for complicity in genocide during the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995.13 The principal Appeals Chamber
decision concerning genocide, Prosecutor v. Krstić,14 coupled with
the dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in that case, left
trial chambers of the Tribunal in some disarray, and subsequent
interpretations took the law in rather different directions.15 In
Blagojević, the Appeals Chamber cited the International Court’s
recent ruling as support for the conclusion that “displacement is
not equivalent to destruction,” and that acts of ethnic cleansing
perpetrated at Srebrenica could not necessarily be taken as evidence of genocidal intent, contrary to what the Trial Chamber had
decided.16
9

See id. ¶¶ 403-406 (confirming Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.) (Merits), [1986] I.C.J.
14, ¶ 115).
10
See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 137 (July
15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić Appeals Judgment]; see also Prosecutor v.
Naletilić, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 184 (Trial Chamber I, Mar. 31,
2003).
11
Id. ¶¶ 461-62.
12
See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
13
See Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber
I, Jan. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Blagojević Trial Judgment].
14
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004)
[hereinafter Krstić Appeals Judgment].
15
Compare Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment (Sept. 1,
2004), with Blagojević Trial Judgment, supra note 13.
16
Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 123
n.337 (May 9, 2007).
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The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has confirmed, on two
occasions, that genocide was committed during the Srebrenica
massacre, but it has as yet not actually convicted anyone of the
crime. General Krstić was found guilty of genocide by the Trial
Chamber,17 but the verdict was reversed and replaced with a conviction for aiding and abetting genocide.18 Blagojević was even
more successful, in that the stigma of ‘the crime of crimes’ was
erased entirely in his case in the May 2007 ruling of the Appeals
Chamber, which overturned the genocide conviction altogether. A
trial involving several defendants concerning the Srebrenica massacre proceeded during 2007.19 In an interlocutory ruling issued
only days after the International Court of Justice decision, the Trial
Chamber declined to take judicial notice of the fact that genocide
had been committed in Bosnia in 1995. Its position places it in
marked contrast with the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR, which has
held that the Rwandan genocide of 1994 is beyond any dispute.20
There are also very divergent views on the subject within the
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, to the extent that a provocative mémoire by the press attaché of Carla del Ponte, published in
September 2007, is to be believed. Florence Hartmann’s book
Paix et châtiment provides gory details of the Prosecutor’s battle
with lawyers on her staff who were resistant to proceeding with
genocide charges in the Milošević case.21 Ms. Hartmann obviously
breached her duties of confidentiality and is arguably in contempt
of the Tribunal. She describes, for example, judgments of the Appeals Chamber on access to Serb documents of which there is no
trace in the publicly available materials of the Tribunal, and which
were presumably ordered to be kept secret. We may wait a long
time to hear the other side of the story, as others may be more reluctant to break their pledges of confidentiality. Prosecutor del
Ponte, who completed her eight years at the Tribunal at the end of
2007, has promised to write her own account.
17

See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber I,
Aug. 2, 2001).
18
See Krstić Appeals Judgment, supra note 14.
19
See Prosecutor v. Popovic, Case No. IT-05-88-PT, Second Consolidated
Amended Indictment (June 14, 2006).
20
See Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision on
Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice (Appeals
Chamber, June 16, 2006).
21
Florence Hartmann, PAIX ET CHÂTIMENT (2007).
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II. BALANCED PROSECUTION AND THE ‘FLIPSIDE’ CASES
¶9

A great dilemma in terms of the selection of cases for
prosecution has been presented by the so-called ‘flipside’ cases.
At the ICTY, this has involved prosecuting a representative sampling of Croatians and Muslims, despite the widely-held view that
Serb forces were primarily responsible for atrocities committed
during the conflict. As a general rule, the sentences imposed upon
the Muslims have been much lower than those for the Serbs, suggesting that the crimes were not of comparable gravity and, possibly, that they were not even within the threshold set by the Security Council of “trying the most senior offenders of crimes which
most seriously violate international public order.”22 The Security
Council has told both Tribunals to concentrate on the most senior
leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the relevant Tribunal.23 This section will examine
the balanced approach to prosecutions in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the ICTR and the ICC.
A. The Balanced Approach at the Special Court for Sierra Leone

¶10

The Special Court for Sierra Leone may have gone furthest
in attempting a balanced approach to prosecutions, organizing
three multiple-defendant trials, each of them focused on one of the
warring parties in the civil war that raged through the 1990s. Two
of these, concerning the rebel Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the pro-government Civil Defence Forces, concluded in
2007 with final judgments of the Trial Chambers. All of the defendants were convicted. However, it became clear in the sentencing phase that the two sides in the conflict were not to be treated
equally, and that a ‘just war’ narrative may emerge from the work
22

Tenth Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, ¶ 4,
U.N. Doc. A/58/297-S/2003/829 (Aug. 20, 2003). See also U.N. Doc.
S/PRST/2002/21; S.C. Res. 1503, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28,
2003); Ninth Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia’, ¶ 6,
U.N. Doc. A/57/379-S/2002/985 (Sept. 4, 2002); ICTY, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, Rule 11bis, Rule 28(A), IT/32/Rev. 41 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev41eb.pdf.
23
See S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
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of the Special Court. The two leaders of the Civil Defence Forces
who were convicted (a third defendant, Hinga Norman, died in
custody in early 2007 before the end of the trial) of war crimes and
crimes against humanity received relatively insignificant terms of
imprisonment of six and eight years.24 By the time the judgment
was rendered in August 2007 they were probably already eligible
for parole, having served two-thirds of their sentences. The Trial
Chamber considered the support of the Civil Defence Forces for
the democratically elected regime to be an important mitigating
factor in determining the appropriate sentence.25 One of the three
judges on the Trial Chamber voted to acquit the defendants altogether.26 He took the view that their defense of a democratic regime essentially excused their crimes, a position that may be politically popular among some elements in Sierra Leone but that is
utterly untenable from the standpoint of international criminal law.
By contrast, the three leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council were convicted and sentenced to terms of forty-five and
fifty years.27 International humanitarian law is said to be concerned with the jus in bello rather than the jus ad bellum, but it
seems that when punishment is being meted out for violations of
the jus in bello, the jus ad bellum may have a powerful effect.
B. Case Selection at the ICTR and the RPF Investigations
¶11

When the Rwanda Tribunal was being established in late
1994, the Commission of Inquiry established by the Security
Council proposed that the Tribunal be aimed primarily at prosecuting those responsible for genocide, but the draft resolution submitted by the United States referred to prosecution of “all persons”
who have violated “international humanitarian law.” The broader
language would also authorize prosecution of members of the
Rwandan Patriotic Front for atrocities in which they might be in24

See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, (Trial Chamber
I, Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Fofana Trial Judgment].
25
See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, ¶¶ 80, 86 (Trial Chamber I, Oct. 9,
2007).
26
See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Separate Concurring and
Partially Dissenting Opinion of Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson Filed Pursuant
to Article 18 of the Statute (Aug. 2, 2007).
27
See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber
II, June 20, 2007) [hereinafter Brima Trial Judgment].
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volved, including allegations of massacres committed after they
took power in July 1994. Aware of this agenda, the Government
of Rwanda opposed including language in the Tribunal’s Statute
that would allow such jurisdiction.28 In the Security Council debate, New Zealand’s representative, Colin Keating, noted that “the
focus of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not on war crimes, but
on genocide, as Rwanda had requested.”29 In 1999, when a judge
refused to confirm charges of genocide with respect to an individual suspected of killing the Prime Minister and several Belgian soldiers, the Prosecutor asked to withdraw the indictment as it did not
conform any longer to the priorities of the Tribunal, which were to
deal with genocide.30
¶12
It has always been an open secret, however, that investigations into atrocities attributed to the Rwandese Patriotic Front and
its military wing, the Rwandese Patriotic Army, were underway.
In her recent book, Florence Hartmann describes the resulting tension between the Office of the Prosecutor and the government of
Rwanda, and defends the view that Carla del Ponte was replaced as
Prosecutor of the ICTR because of her determination to proceed
against the Rwandese Patriotic Front.31 But the book also shows,
perhaps inadvertently, that permanent members of the Security
Council wanted to remove Prosecutor del Ponte altogether, but
compromised by allowing her to remain at the ICTY for an additional four-year term.32 The explanation that her mandate for
Rwanda was not renewed in 2003 because of her zealotry concerning the Rwandan leaders appears to be an oversimplification.
¶13
Be that as it may, in 2004, the President of the Security
Council called upon all States, and “especially Rwanda . . . to intensify cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to the
ICTR, including on investigation of the Rwandan Patriotic Army. .
. .”33 The Prosecutor told the Security Council that his office was
evaluating evidence with a view to determining whether there was
28
See Raymond Bonner, U.N. Commission Recommends Rwanda ‘Genocide’
Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1994, at A13.
29
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994).
30
See Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, Case No. ICTR-98-40-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw the Indictment (Trial Chamber I, Mar. 18, 1999).
31
See Hartmann, supra note 21.
32
Id.
33
Statement by the President of the Security Council, at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/PRST/2004/28 (Aug. 4, 2004). See also U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5016th mtg. at
4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5016 (Aug. 4, 2004).
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a sufficient basis for prosecution.34 In November 2004, Prosecutor
Jallow told the Security Council:
We are deeply aware of the fact that the investigation of those allegations falls within our mandate
and our duty at the Tribunal. We are also conscious
that the Security Council is currently concerned
about this particular issue. Investigations have been
conducted over a period of many years. At this
stage, as I mentioned to counsellors at the last meeting, we are not conducting any more investigations,
but we have started a process of assessing what material has been gathered over the years in order for
me to be able to determine what cases exist - and
against whom - with regard to those particular allegations of Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) involvement. I have indicated to the Rwanda authorities themselves that I am assessing the material at
the moment and will get back to them to advise
them of the outcome of my assessment in due
course. This will hopefully take place early in the
year. That is the situation as far as the RPF is concerned.35
More than three years later, there was still no clarity on the subject.
In December 2007, Prosecutor Jallow stated: “Since my last report
to the Security Council, my office has also made progress in the
investigation of the allegations against members of the Rwandese
Patriotic Front. We look forward to concluding this matter early
next year.”36
C. The Need for Balance at the ICC
¶14

Issues of a similar nature also face the International Criminal
Court. Responding to the referral of the ‘situation in northern
34

See U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4999th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4999 (June 29,
2004).
35
U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5086th mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5086 (Nov. 23,
2004).
36
U.N. SCOR, Sess., 62d Sess., 5796th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5796 (Dec.
10, 2007).
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Uganda,’ in mid-2005 the Prosecutor requested arrest warrants for
five leaders of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army.37 When the arrest warrants were unsealed, in October 2005, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch questioned the one-sided approach, and called upon the Prosecutor to proceed against the government forces as well.38 The Prosecutor responded to the criticism: “We therefore started with an investigation of the LRA. At
the same time, we have continued to collect information on allegations concerning all other groups, to determine whether other
crimes meet the stringent thresholds of the Statute and our policy
are met.”39 But in 2007, there was no evidence of any interest from
the Office of the Prosecutor in pursuing Ugandan officials for
crimes committed during the civil war or, for that matter, regarding
its military activities in eastern Congo.
¶15
Thus, to one extent or the other, it seems that all of the
international criminal tribunals have been wrestling with a cluster
of issues relating to the motivations of those who perpetrate atrocities. International humanitarian law takes the position that this issue is irrelevant, but it nevertheless rears its head in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion about targeting of investigations as well as
in judicial determinations of appropriate sentences.
III. HATE PROPAGANDA AND INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE
¶16

In November 2007, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda issued its judgment in the so37

See generally Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-87, Decision on
the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest under Article 59, Unsealed
as of Oct. 13, 2005 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, July 8, 2005).
38
See Amnesty International, Uganda: First Ever Arrest Warrants by International Criminal Court - a First Step Towards Addressing Impunity, Oct. 14,
2005,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR59/008/2005/en/domAFR590082005en.html; Human Rights Watch, ICC Takes Decisive Step for
Justice
in
Uganda,
Oct.
14,
2005,
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/10/14/uganda11880.htm.
39
International Criminal Court: Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Informal meeting
of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 24, 2005, at 7, available
at
www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20051024_English.pdf.
See also International Criminal Court: Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fourth
Session of the Assembly of States Parties, 28 November – 3 December 2005,
Nov.
28,
2005,
at
2,
available
at
www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20051128_English.pdf.
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called ‘media trial.’ The accused were three prominent journalists
who had worked for the racist newspaper Kangura as well as the
notorious radio station Radio-télévision libre des mille collines.
Many findings of the Trial Chamber were overturned, and spectators attending the reading of the judgment by President Fausto Pocar say they feared the three might be acquitted entirely. But despite the many flaws that the Appeals Chamber found with the trial
judgment, convictions were sustained on several counts and the
ultimate sentences were barely touched.
¶17
The Appeals Chamber addressed important factual issues as
it struggled to establish whether mere words could rise to the level
of international crime. In contrast with the Trial Chamber, it found
that broadcasts of Radio-télévision libre des mille collines prior to
the outbreak of genocide in April 1994 were not punishable acts.
However, some of the issues of Kangura published in the first
months of 1994 were held to constitute incitement to commit
genocide and crimes against humanity.
¶18
The Appeals Chamber upheld convictions for direct and
public incitement to commit genocide. It also confirmed that this
is an inchoate crime, whose commission does not require any acts
as a consequence. This was all rather theoretical, given that in
1994 the Rwandan media incited crimes that actually took place,
and that were therefore punishable as complicity or aiding and
abetting in genocide. Thus, with respect to genocide, the legal
findings are unremarkable.
¶19
More significant is the Appeals Chamber’s conclusion with
respect to hate speech or hate propaganda. Already, in an early
Trial Chamber ruling, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda had endorsed an approach to crimes against humanity by
which hate speech formed the basis of a conviction for the crime
against humanity of persecution. However, the judgment was the
result of a plea agreement, and it was never appealed.40 In the
‘media trial,’ the Trial Chamber said:
The Chamber considers it evident that hate speech
targeting a population on the basis of ethnicity, or
other discriminatory grounds, reaches this level of
gravity and constitutes persecution under Article
40

See Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶
18-24 (Trial Chamber I, June 1, 2000).
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3(h) of its Statute. In Ruggiu, the Tribunal so held,
finding that the radio broadcasts of [Radio télévision libre des mille collines], in singling out and attacking the Tutsi ethnic minority, constituted a deprivation of ‘the fundamental rights to life, liberty
and basic humanity enjoyed by members of the
wider society.’ Hate speech is a discriminatory
form of aggression that destroys the dignity of those
in the group under attack. It creates a lesser status
not only in the eyes of the group members themselves but also in the eyes of others who perceive
and treat them as less than human. The denigration
of persons on the basis of their ethnic identity or
other group membership in and of itself, as well as
in its other consequences, can be an irreversible
harm.41
¶20

In reaching its conclusion, the Trial Chamber of the Rwanda
Tribunal reviewed authorities from international human rights law
as well as national legislation prohibiting hate speech, concluding
that “hate speech that expresses ethnic and other forms of discrimination violates the norm of customary international law prohibiting discrimination.”42 For the Trial Chamber, the crime of
persecution by hate speech could be committed even where there is
no call to violence, or where violence does not actually result.
¶21
This holding appears to derive largely from a misreading of
the Streicher case before the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremburg. Streicher was prosecuted for incitement to the crime
against humanity of murder. Although Streicher’s hate-mongering
in the pre-war period was referred to in the Nuremberg judgment’s
narrative,43 as a question of law none of the accused were actually
convicted for acts committed prior to the outbreak of the war.44
The Nuremberg judgment is thus not authority for the proposition
that hate speech falling short of incitement to murder that actually
occurs is punishable under international law.
41

Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 1072 (Trial
Chamber I, Dec. 3, 2003).
42
Id. ¶ 1076.
43
U.S. v. Goering, 6 F.R.D. 69, 100-102 (Int’l Mil. Trib. 1946).
44
See Id. at 84-127.
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¶22

The Appeals Chamber ruling of November 2007 was more
nuanced. The Chamber agreed with the trial judges that hate
speech violated human dignity and was a form of discrimination,
but it said it was not convinced that taken on its own hate speech
amounted to a violation of life, liberty and physical integrity. The
Appeals Chamber held that it was “not satisfied that hate speech
alone can amount to a violation of the rights to life, freedom and
physical integrity of the human being. Thus other persons need to
intervene before such violations can occur; a speech cannot, in itself, directly kill members of a group, imprison or physically injure
them.”45 Without overruling the pronouncement of the Trial
Chamber explicitly, the Appeals Chamber found it unnecessary to
determine whether hate speech alone amounted to the crime
against humanity of persecution, given that in the case of Rwanda
the various acts imputed to the media were part of a broad campaign of persecution that should be considered as a whole.46 The
Appeals Chamber held that broadcasts made after the beginning of
the genocide on April 6, 1994 were part of this campaign and
therefore constituted the crime against humanity of persecution.47
¶23
The Appeals Chamber was clearly divided, and this is
reflected in the equivocal language of its judgment. In his individual opinion, President Pocar said that the judgment was not sufficiently clear in stating that hate speech on its own could constitute
persecution, the Rwandan case providing a perfect example of
this.48 Judge Shahabuddeen appeared to share much the same perspective.49 On the opposite end of the spectrum, Judge Meron
wrote a strong dissent in which, with reference to the drafting history of the Genocide Convention, he argued that “Mere Hate
Speech is Not Criminal.”50
¶24
An interesting feature of the ‘media case’ is the conviction of
one of the three accused, Ferdinand Nahimana, on the basis of superior or command responsibility. As a general rule, superior or
command responsibility has generated more heat than light. At the
ICTR, where there have been a few convictions on this basis alone,
45

Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 986
(Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Nahimana Appeals Judgment].
46
Id. ¶ 988.
47
Id. ¶¶ 988, 995.
48
Id., Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fausto Pocar, ¶ 3.
49
Id., Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, ¶¶ 7-20, 74.
50
Id., Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Meron, ¶ 5-8.
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its scope has been confined to war crimes, and the sentences that
have resulted have been relatively light.51 The obvious suggestion
is that superior or command responsibility is not nearly as serious a
form of liability as primary perpetration. The conviction of Nahimana for genocide solely as a result of superior responsibility, and
the imposition of a thirty-year term of imprisonment, stands out as
a dramatic exception in this context. The Appeals Chamber
quashed Nahimana’s convictions based upon Article 6(1) of the
Statute, that is, as a principal perpetrator or accomplice, but upheld
his convictions based upon Article 6(3). It reduced the sentence
from one of life imprisonment as a result.52 A professor of history
at the National University of Rwanda in Butare, Nahimana was a
prominent ideologue and political activist in pre-genocide Rwanda.
In 1992, Nahimana participated in the establishment of Radio télévision libre des mille collines. According to the Appeals Chamber, Nahimana was the founder and guiding spirit of the radio station, with influence over its activities and the content of its broadcasts, but he failed to intervene to prevent the incitement. Judge
Meron, in his partly dissenting opinion, considered the sentence
“too harsh,” given that “[d]espite the severity of this crime, Nahimana did not personally kill anyone and did not personally make
statements that constituted incitement.”53
¶25
Nahimana might be said to demonstrate the real utility of the
superior responsibility concept. Nahimana was deeply involved in
the operation of the racist radio station. It was part of his more
general involvement in the anti-Tutsi movement in Rwanda that
culminated in the terrible events of April to July 1994. But the
Appeals Chamber said there was no evidence linking him directly
to the broadcasts. This recalls the judgment of General Yamashita
in the final months of 1945, who was convicted for failing to intervene when Japanese troops under his command pillaged the city of
Manila.54 Perhaps, however, the result in the Appeals Chamber
judgment is the consequence of strategic decisions by the Prosecu51

Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, ¶ 481 (Trial Chamber
II, Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment, ¶ 2084 (Trial Chamber II, Mar. 15, 2006); Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No.
IT-03-68-T, Judgment, ¶ 783 (Trial Chamber II, June 30, 2006).
52
Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 45, ¶ 1052.
53
Id., Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Meron, ¶ 22.
54
U.S. v. Yamashita, 4 L.R.T.W.C. 1, 36-37 (1948). See also In re Yamashita,
327 US 1 (1945).
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tor, who might well have approached the issue in another manner.
Nahimana could have been charged as part of a joint criminal enterprise to incite genocide, one for which he would then readily
have been convicted as the directing mind of a notorious radio station whose broadcasts dramatically contributed to the carnage.
Such an approach might also more accurately describe his culpability. As a mastermind of the racist campaign against the Tutsi,
his real crime must have been so much more than simply failing to
supervise his subalterns. Indeed, how else can a thirty-year sentence be explained?
IV. TRANSFERRING CASES BACK TO NATIONAL COURTS
¶26

Rather like the hungry man or woman at an ‘all you can eat’
buffet, the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda filled their plates only to discover that they could not digest everything. By 2003, the Security Council was insisting that
they wind up their activities. One way to do this was to transfer
cases to national jurisdictions, a process that began in 2005.
Transfers of individuals who have already been indicted, whether
or not they are in custody, require the authorization of a Trial
Chamber or a three-judge ‘Referral Bench.’ One of the interesting
features of the applicable law, the result of Rule 11 bis of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence of the two tribunals, is the possibility of
transferring cases to states with no traditional jurisdictional link to
the crime or the offender, in accordance with the principle of universality. By the beginning of 2007, several transfers had been
successfully accomplished, with accused persons being sent to
Bosnia and Herzegovina for trial before special chambers of the
national justice system.55
¶27
At the ICTR, the process began more slowly. By the
beginning of 2007, only one application had been made for transfer, to Norway, and it had been denied by the judges because of
inadequacies in Norwegian legislation.56 In 2007, the Prosecutor
applied for and obtained the transfer of the same case to the Neth55

See Michael Bohlander, Last Exit Bosnia – Transferring War Crimes Prosecution for the International Tribunal to Domestic Courts, 14 CRIM. L.F. 59
(2003); Mark S. Ellis, Coming to Terms with its Past - Serbia's New Court for
the Prosecution of War Crimes, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 165 (2004).
56
See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR 05-86-AR11bis, Decision on
Rule 11bis Appeal (Appeals Chamber, Aug. 30, 2006).
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erlands.57 The ruling of the Trial Chamber was not appealed, given
that the accused himself much preferred trial in Europe to any of
the alternatives, including the threat of transfer to Rwanda itself.
But in August 2007, a ruling of the Dutch national courts in an unrelated case established a precedent that cast doubts on the prospect of effective prosecution of Bagaragaza in the Netherlands.
The Prosecutor demanded that Bagaragaza be returned to the custody of the International Tribunal, and that the transfer order be
rescinded. By the end of the year, Bagaragaza’s fate was uncertain. He had been in custody in The Hague awaiting transfer to a
national jurisdiction for two years.
¶28
The Prosecutor has regularly lamented the fact that few
countries have shown any interest in prosecuting transfer cases
from the Rwanda Tribunal. The big exception to this is Rwanda
itself, which actually resents transfer to other jurisdictions and considers that its courts are the natural forum for genocide trials that
the International Tribunal will not undertake. Prior to 2007, in the
bi-annual reports to the Security Council on the completion strategy, the Prosecutor had expressed his concern that Rwanda’s
courts were not in a position to take cases. He spoke of problems
of capacity within the national justice system as well as the possibility of capital punishment, which remained an option under
Rwandan law.58 In March 2007, the Rwandan parliament enacted
legislation providing for a special legal regime for cases transferred by the Tribunal, and clarified the fact that there would be no
capital punishment.59
¶29
The first application for transfer of a case to Rwanda was
filed by the Prosecutor in June 2007.60 Because the accused was
not in custody, it was unlikely that there would be much opposition
to the proceedings. Then, human rights NGOs intervened to op57

See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-R11bis, Decision on
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Indictment to the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Trial Chamber III, Apr. 13 2007).
58
See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5594th mtg. at 13-4, UN Doc. S/PV.5594
(Dec. 15, 2006).
59
Organic Law No. 11/2007 of 16/03/2007, Concerning Transfer of Cases to the
Republic of Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and
from Other States, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Year 46, Special
issue of 19 March 2007, p. 22.
60
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 01-67-I, Request for the Referral of
the Case of Fulgence Kayishema to Rwanda pursuant to Rule 11 bis of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (June 11, 2007).
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pose the transfers, arguing that the Rwandan courts could not deliver trials that would be acceptable under international standards.61
When the Prosecutor informed the Security Council of the first application for referral to Rwanda, in June 2007, he said that if it
were successful, others would follow.62 By the end of the year, the
first case had not yet been heard. However, the Prosecutor chose
to proceed with additional applications in other cases.
¶30
The Prosecutor also applied for transfer of two cases to
France. These involved accused persons who were already in
France. The transfers were not contested, and no NGOs complained about the French justice system.63 Only Rwanda was unhappy, and it said as much to the Security Council when it learned
of the transfers. The Rwandan representative said: “My Government has serious concerns about this – principally because wellknown fugitives at large continue to live in that country with impunity. We intend to raise this issue with the appropriate authorities at the highest level.”64
¶31
At the ICTY, where transfer has become almost routine, the
Appeals Chamber intervened to deny the Prosecutor’s request to
transfer the case of Milan Lukić after it had been authorized by a
Referral Bench. Lukić had been a leader of the White Eagles, a
paramilitary organization. He was arrested in Argentina in 2005,
and subsequently transferred to the Tribunal in The Hague. In
April 2007, the Prosecutor obtained authorization to transfer the
accused to the national courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the
61

See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 2001-67-I, Brief of Human
Rights Watch as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Rule 11 bis Transfer (Jan. 3,
2008); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 2001-67-I, Brief of Amicus
Curiae, International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association (ICDAA), Concerning the Request for Refferral [sic] of the Accused to Rwanda Pursuant to
Rule 11 Bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rule 74 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence) (Jan. 3, 2008).
62
U.N. SCOR, 62nd Sess., 5697th mtg. at 15, UN Doc. S/PV.5697 (June 18,
2007).
63
Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR 2005-86-I, Décision relative à la
requête du Procureur aux fins de renvoi de l’acte d’accusation contre Laurent
Bucyibaruta aux autorités françaises [Decision relating to the request of the
Prosecutor for purposes of referral of the bill of indictment against Laurent Bucyibaruta to the French authorities] (Trial Chamber III, Nov. 20, 2007); Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR 2005-87-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to France
(Trial Chamber III, Nov. 20, 2007).
64
U.N. SCOR, 62nd Sess., 5697th mtg. at 32, UN Doc. S/PV.5697 (June 18,
2007).
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ground that Lukić was not one of the “most senior leaders” and
that as a result trial before the International Tribunal was not appropriate.65 One of the bizarre features of such litigation is that
sometimes, as in this case, it is the accused who appeals the transfer, arguing that he is in effect worse than the Prosecutor has portrayed him. The Appeals Chamber confirmed that paramilitary
leaders could be tried at either level, national or international, but it
felt the Trial Chamber had underestimated the significance of the
accused. The Trial Chamber had focused on the local dimension
of his influence, but for the Appeals Chamber, “within his own
sphere, he was a dominant presence.”66 Given the importance of
prosecuting paramilitary leaders, the Appeals Chamber ordered
that trial take place before the International Tribunal and not the
national courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.67
V. JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE ON A BROAD SCALE
¶32

The doctrine of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ has been at the
core of the complicity paradigm of the Tribunals since it was first
enunciated in the ICTY Appeals Chamber decision in Tadić.68 Not
set out explicitly in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the concept
was developed with reference to theories of organized crime in national legal systems as well as precedents established in the postWorld War II decisions. In the leading case, Tadić, the accused
was convicted for murders committed by his associates as part of a
raid on a Muslim community. The doctrine was conceived of as
applicable to criminal activity on a relatively small and localized
scale, as it had been in Tadić. Its relevance to much broader forms
of criminal activity remained a matter in dispute until the Appeals
Chamber, in April 2007, confirmed that big fish as well as small
fry could be part of a joint criminal enterprise.

65

Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case
Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex A and Annex B, ¶ 29-30 (Referral Bench, Apr. 5 2007).
66
Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-AR11bis.1, Decision on Milan
Lukić’s Appeal Regarding Referral, ¶ 21 (Appeals Chamber, July 11, 2007).
67
Id. ¶ 28.
68
Tadić Appeals Judgment, supra note 10, ¶ 220.
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A. The Brđanin Case
¶33

In September 2004, charges based upon joint criminal
enterprise had been dismissed by an ICTY Trial Chamber in the
trial of Radoslav Brđanin.69 The accused had served as president of
the ‘Crisis Group’ of the Autonomous Region of Krajina. Relying
upon earlier formulations by the Appeals Chamber, the Trial
Chamber concluded that the joint criminal enterprise theory was
inapplicable. It held that the primary perpetrator of the criminal
act must be a member of the joint criminal enterprise.70 The consequence was to confine the doctrine to small groups, and to exclude its relevance to large scale criminal plans in which the primary perpetrator may even be ignorant of the overall intentions of
the leaders and organizers.
¶34
The ICTY Appeals Chamber reversed the legal findings of
the Trial Chamber, thereby holding that joint criminal enterprise
was applicable not only to ‘small cases’ but to large-scale criminal
enterprises involving primary perpetrators or offenders who are
personally outside of the common plan. Referring to two postWorld War II cases, the Appeals Chamber said it found strong
support for the imposition of criminal liability upon an accused for
participation in a common criminal purpose, “where the conduct
that comprises the criminal actus reus is perpetrated by persons
who do not share the common purpose.” There is no requirement
of proof “that there was an understanding or an agreement to
commit that particular crime between the accused and the principal
perpetrator of the crime.”71
¶35
One of the authorities relied upon by the Brđanin Appeals
Chamber, known as the Justice Case, involved prosecution of leading judges, magistrates and prosecutors for their role in implementing the racist and genocidal Nazi policy.72 The Appeals Chamber
cited one of the conclusions in the Justice Case: “The material
facts which must be proved in any case are (1) the fact of the great
pattern or plan of racial persecution and extermination; and (2)
specific conduct of the individual defendant in furtherance of the
69

Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 355-356 (Trial
Chamber II, Sept. 1, 2004).
70
See id.
71
Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 394 (Apr.
3, 2007) [hereinafter Brđanin Appeals Judgment].
72
U.S. v. Alstötter (“Justice Trial”), 3 T.W.C. 1, 6 L.R.T.W.C. 1, 14 Ann. Dig.
278 (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948).
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plan. This is but an application of general concepts of criminal
law.”73 Interestingly, in a 2002 ruling where it decided that crimes
against humanity need not be committed pursuant to a state policy,
the same Appeals Chamber described the Justice Case as “not to
constitute an authoritative statement of customary international
law.”74
¶36
The Appeals Chamber relied heavily on the analysis of Judge
Iain Bonomy in his separate opinion in a preliminary ruling in
Milutinović the previous year. Judge Bonomy also analyzed the
Justice Case. He wrote:
The Military Tribunal appears to have imposed
criminal responsibility on both accused for their
participation in the common criminal plan although
they did not perpetrate the actus reus of the crimes
of which they were convicted; the actus reus was
instead perpetrated by executioners simply carrying
out the orders of the court. Nowhere did the Tribunal discuss the mental state of the executioners who
carried out the death sentences imposed as a result
of the actions of Lautz, Rothaug, and their fellow
participants in the common plan, or whether such
persons even had knowledge that the death sentences formed part of a plan to pervert the law for
the purpose of exterminating Jews and other ‘undesirables.’75
¶37

The other post-World War II case referred to by the Brđanin
Appeals Chamber, and discussed by Judge Bonomy in his separate
opinion, involved the SS Race and Resettlement Main Office, and
is known as the RuSHA case. The RuSHA leaders were charged
with participating in a “systematic program of genocide.”76 As
Judge Bonomy explained, the United States Military Tribunal con73

Brđanin Appeals Judgment, supra note 71, ¶ 397 (citing Justice Trial, 3
T.W.C. 1, p. 1063).
74
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 98 n.114
(June 12, 2002).
75
Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Indirect Co-Perpetrations, Separate Opinion of
Judge Iain Bonomy, ¶ 20 (Mar. 22, 2006).
76
U.S. v. Greifelt (“RuSHA Case”), 4 T.W.C. 1, p. 609, 13 L.R.T.W.C. 1 (U.S.
Mil. Trib. 1948).
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cluded that Hitler, SS leader Himmler and other Nazi officials
shared a “two-fold objective of weakening and eventually destroying other nations while at the same time strengthening Germany,
territorially and biologically, at the expense of conquered nations.”77 The leadership of RuSHA adhered to and enthusiastically
participated in the execution of this ‘Germanization plan.’78
¶38
The Appeals Chamber agreed that the RuSHA Judgment
supported the position that high officials involved in devising the
Germanization plan were criminally responsible for the conduct of
the agents who carried out the crimes, “without any discussion of
whether the principal perpetrators had knowledge that their actions
formed part of the Germanization plan, or of whether an agreement
existed between the accused and these agents.”79 The Brđanin Appeals Chamber also noted that much of the early case law of the
ICTY dealt with small-scale joint criminal enterprises, and was not
therefore good authority when broader schemes were concerned.80
It referred to two exceptions, both of them involving senior leaders.81
B. The AFRC Judgment at the SCSL
¶39

Another significant development in 2007 concerning joint
criminal enterprise was the dismissal, by a Trial Chamber of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, of charges because of the manner
in which the concept was pleaded. The indictment had charged
three leaders of the Armed Forced Revolutionary Council as follows:
33. The AFRC, including ALEX TAMBA BRIMA,
BRIMA BAZZY KAMARA and SANTIGIE
BORBOR KANU, and the RUF, including ISSA
HASSAN SESAY, MORRIS KALLON and
77

Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Decision on Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Indirect Co-Perpetrations, Separate Opinion of
Judge Iain Bonomy, ¶ 22 (Mar. 22, 2006) (citing RuSHA Case, 4 T.W.C. 1, p.
90).
78
Id.
79
Brđanin Appeals Judgment, supra note 71, ¶ 403.
80
Id. ¶ 407.
81
Id. ¶¶ 408-9 (citing Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment (Mar. 22, 2006); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals
Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004)).

2008]

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS

403

AUGUSTINE GBAO, shared a common plan, purpose or design (joint criminal enterprise) which was
to take any actions necessary to gain and exercise
political power and control over the territory of Sierra Leone, in particular the diamond mining areas.
The natural resources of Sierra Leone, in particular
the diamonds, were to be provided to persons outside Sierra Leone in return for assistance in carrying
out the joint criminal enterprise.
34. The joint criminal enterprise included gaining
and exercising control over the population of Sierra
Leone in order to prevent or minimize resistance to
their geographic control, and to use members of the
population to provide support to the members of the
joint criminal enterprise. The crimes alleged in this
Indictment, including unlawful killings, abductions,
forced labour, physical and sexual violence, use of
child soldiers, looting and burning of civilian structures, were either actions within the joint criminal
enterprise or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise.82
The Trial Chamber took the view that paragraphs 33 and 34 of the
indictment did not disclose a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court as a common purpose of the joint enterprise. It departed
from a preliminary ruling that had upheld the validity of the indictment. According to the Trial Chamber, the charge that the accused took “actions necessary to gain and exercise political power
and control over the territory of Sierra Leone, in particular the
diamond mining areas” is not a criminal purpose recognized by the
Tribunal’s Statute nor is it an international crime.83 “Whether to
prosecute the perpetrators of rebellion for their act of rebellion and
challenge to the constituted authority of the State as a matter of
internal law is for the state authority to decide,” it explained.
“There is no rule against rebellion in international law.”84
82

Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶¶ 33-34 (May 13, 2004).
83
Brima Trial Judgment, supra note 27, ¶ 67.
84
Id.
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The same issue also arose in the second judgment of the
Special Court, which was issued in August 2007. There, the
Prosecutor had charged a different type of joint criminal enterprise,
namely using “any means necessary to defeat the RUF/AFRC
forces and to gain and exercise control over the territory of Sierra
Leone. This included gaining complete control over the population
of Sierra Leone and the complete elimination of the RUF/AFRC,
its supporters, sympathizers, and anyone who did not actively resist the RUF/AFRC occupation of Sierra Leone.”85 The indictment
did not use the term ‘joint criminal enterprise,’ but the Trial
Chamber seemed to consider that the words “plan, purpose or design” which did appear in paragraph 19 of the indictment were sufficient.86 Perhaps the Prosecutor did not describe the enterprise as
‘criminal’ because this case involved the Civil Defence Forces,
who were defending the regime. The Trial Chamber concluded
that although “Norman, Fofana, Kondewa and their subordinates
may have acted in concert with each other, we find that there is no
evidence upon which to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that
they did so in order to further a common purpose, plan or design to
commit criminal acts.”87 The discussion was perfunctory, and
there is little guidance either about the nature of the ‘joint criminal
enterprise’ allegedly charged by the Prosecutor or the Trial Chamber’s reasons for dismissing it. Hopefully the Appeals Chamber
will sort things out, as the matter may be of decisive importance in
the Charles Taylor trial, now ongoing in 2008.
VI. SOME PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS

¶41

The tribunals have been at work now for more than a decade.
Very sophisticated rules and principles concerning procedure and
evidence have been developed over this time. Often they represent
compromises based upon practice in different legal traditions.
Novel problems do, however, continue to present themselves.
Three developments in this area will be discussed: (1) the issue of
‘witness proofing,’ (2) a possible exception to the right of the accused to be present at trial, and (3) the ‘confirmation hearing’ at
the International Criminal Court.
85

Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-03-14-I, Indictment, ¶ 19 (Feb. 5,
2004).
86
Fofana Trial Judgment, supra note 24, ¶ 217.
87
Id. ¶¶ 732, 744, 771, 804, 815, 907, 908, 914, 915, 939, 940, 949, 950.
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A. Witness Proofing
¶42

Witness proofing is a practice by which counsel prepare a
witness for testimony. Some systems prohibit it altogether, others
tolerate it to a certain extent, and in some systems, especially in the
United States, the practice is both widespread and subject to relatively few constraints. It has become a feature of the work of the
Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL.88 The debate about witness proofing was revived in 2006, when a Pre-Trial
Chamber of the ICC essentially condemned the practice at the ad
hoc tribunals and forbade lawyers from coaching their witnesses
beyond telling them where to find the courthouse door, the toilets
and the coffee machine.89 The decision nourished attempts by defense lawyers to overturn precedent and have the ad hoc tribunals
follow the line set by the ICC, but to no avail.90 In May 2007, the
Appeals Chamber of the ICTR confirmed that there would be no
change in the law before that body.91 The authoritative Appeals
Chamber decision was then invoked by the Prosecutor before a
Trial Chamber of the ICC in the hopes that it would reverse the
earlier decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber. But the Trial Chamber
refused to budge.92 Referring to the rulings of the ad hoc tribunals
on the same subject, it said:
44. However, this precedent is in no sense binding
on the Trial Chamber at this Court. Article 21 of
88

See Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10, Decision on Communication
between Parties and Witnesses (Trial Chamber, Dec. 11, 1998); Prosecutor v,
Limaj, Case No IT-03-66-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on Prosecution
Practice of Proofing Witnesses (Trial Chamber II, Dec. 10, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Sesay, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for the Exclusion of Certain Portions of Supplemental Statements of Witness TF1-117
(Trial Chamber I, Feb. 27, 2006).
89
See generally Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/0401/06-679, Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness
Proofing, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Nov. 8, 2006).
90
See generally Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on
Defence Motions to Prohibit Witness Proofing (Trial Chamber III, Dec. 15,
2006); Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Ojdanić
Motion to Prohibit Witness Proofing (Trial Chamber, Dec. 12, 2006).
91
Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.8, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing (Appeals Chamber, May 11,
2007).
92
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, Public, ¶ 56-57 (Trial Chamber I, Nov. 30, 2007).
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the Statute requires the Chamber to apply first the
Statute, Elements of Crimes and Rules of the ICC.
Thereafter, if ICC legislation is not definitive on the
issue, the Trial Chamber should apply, where appropriate, principles and rules of international law.
In the instant case, the issue before the Chamber is
procedural in nature. While this would not, ipso
facto, prevent all procedural issues from scrutiny
under Article 21(l)(b), the Chamber does not consider the procedural rules and jurisprudence of the
ad hoc Tribunals to be automatically applicable to
the ICC without detailed analysis.
45. The ICC Statute has, through important advances, created a procedural framework which differs markedly from the ad hoc tribunals, such as, for
example, in the requirement in the Statute that the
prosecution should investigate exculpatory as well
as incriminatory evidence, for which the Statute and
Rules of the ad hoc tribunals do not provide. Also,
the Statute seemingly permits greater intervention
by the Bench, as well as introducing the unique
element of victim participation. Therefore, the Statute moves away from the procedural regime of the
ad hoc tribunals, introducing additional and novel
elements to aid the process of establishing the truth.
Thus, the procedure of preparation of witnesses before trial is not easily transferable into the system of
law created by the ICC Statute and Rules. Therefore, while acknowledging the importance of considering the practice and jurisprudence at the ad hoc
tribunals, the Chamber is not persuaded that the application of ad hoc procedures, in the context of
preparation of witnesses for trial, is appropriate.93
¶43

Thus, there is a significant rift in the procedural law applied
by the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals. The issue is a relatively minor one, but the willingness of judges at the ICC to depart from
earlier precedent may portend future innovations and develop93

Id. ¶ 44-45 (emphasis omitted).
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ments. Reliance upon legal points decided by the ad hoc tribunals
may not help to clinch any arguments before the ICC which,
clearly, has a mind of its own. Some will see this as a troublesome
source of legal uncertainty. On the other hand, it enriches the law
and gives it dynamism. International criminal law may be the better for it.
B. The Right of the Defendant to be Present at Trial
¶44

The right of the defendant to be present at trial is set out in
the statutes of all of the international tribunals, in language borrowed from article 14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.94 According to the Appeals Chamber of the
ICTR, “the physical presence of an accused before the court, as a
general rule, is one of the most basic and common precepts of a
fair criminal trial.” The Appeals Chamber has pointed to the clarity of the language and practical import of Article 20(4)(d) of the
Statute (equivalent provisions appear in the statutes of the other
two ad hoc tribunals): “First, as a matter of ordinary English, the
term ‘presence’ implies physical proximity. A review of the
French version of the Statute leads to the same conclusion, in particular in the context of the phrase ‘être présente au process,’ conveying unambiguously that Article 20(4)(d) refers to physical presence at the trial.’95 Moreover, a form of ‘constructive presence,’
such as attendance by video-link, is no substitute for physical presence, and cannot be imposed upon a defendant.96
¶45
Nevertheless, in 2007, confronted with a short-term illness of
an accused, a Trial Chamber of the ICTR decided to proceed in his
absence. The Trial Chamber had justified its exception to the principle of presence at trial by balancing this with the need to ensure
an expeditious trial. It was overturned by the Appeals Chamber,
but not because as a matter of principle it would be forbidden to
proceed where an accused was absent through no choice or fault of
his or her own. Rather, the Appeals Chamber accepted the Trial
Chamber’s balancing test, but held that the minimal, three-day de94

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316, at art. 14(1) (1966).
95
Zigiranyirazo v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶ 11 (Appeals Chamber, Oct. 30, 2006) (citations omitted).
96
Id. ¶ 12.
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lay to the trial resulting from the accused’s illness did not outweigh
the accused’s right to be present at his own trial when his absence
was due to no fault of his own.97
¶46
Although in absentia trials as such have been rejected as an
option—in the case of the ICC quite explicitly98—there is no shortage of authority for the proposition that a defendant may waive the
right to be present at trial under specific circumstances. For example, a defendant before the ICTY attended portions of his trial by
video-link due to illness, but his right to physical presence was explicitly waived.99 Waiver may also take place where a defendant
wilfully and substantially obstructs the proceedings.100 Some defendants have chosen to boycott proceedings, as a form of protest
against rulings by the bench. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza refused to
attend his trial before the ICTR. He issued a statement “refusing to
associate himself with a show trial” and insisting that “the ICTR
was manipulated by the current Rwandan government and the
judges and the prosecutors were the hostage[s] of Kigali.”101
¶47
Barayagwiza unsuccessfully raised the matter on appeal,
where he argued that nothing in the Statute or the Rules authorized
proceedings in his absence. During the appeals hearing, his counsel suggested that the Tribunal might have brought him to court
physically in order to ensure his presence at trial.102 In its November 2007 ruling, the Appeals Chamber observed that the SecretaryGeneral’s report of May 3, 1993 did not oppose the idea that a trial
might proceed in the absence of a defendant who refused to appear.
The famous reference in the report to in absentia trials was addressed to individuals who had not yet been apprehended by the
Tribunal.103 According to the Appeals Chamber, an accused person
can renounce his or her presence at trial providing this is “libre,
97

Prosecutor v. Nzirorera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.10, Decision on Nzirorera’s Interlocutory Appeal Concerning his Right to be Present at Trial, ¶ 15
(Appeals Chamber, Oct. 5, 2007).
98
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 64.
99
Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT 95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 8 (Trial
Chamber II, Oct. 17, 2002).
100
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense
Counsel, ¶ 13 (Appeals Chamber, Nov. 1, 2004).
101
Mercedeh Momeni, Why Barayagwiza is Boycotting his Trial at the ICTR:
Lessons in Balancing Due Process Rights and Politics, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 315, 315-16 (2001).
102
Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 45, ¶ 89 n.186.
103
Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 45, ¶ 98.
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non équivoque (même si elle peut être expresse ou tacite) et faite
en connaissance de cause.”104 It noted that these were the same
criteria applicable to renunciation by a suspect of the right to be
assisted by counsel during questioning, pursuant to Rule 42(B),105
and to the validity of a renunciation by an accused person of the
protection against self-incrimination.106 The Appeals Chamber
said an accused must have received notice of the date and place of
the trial, and of the charges against him or her, and the right to be
present at trial. Moreover, where an accused who is in custody refuses to attend, the interests of justice require that counsel be designated.107 Barayagwiza’s appeal on grounds that he had not been
present at trial was therefore dismissed, given that he had voluntarily waived his right.
C. Confirmation Hearings at the ICC
¶48

In January 2007, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the International
Criminal Court issued its first decision following a ‘confirmation
hearing.’ In November and December, it had heard evidence concerning charges against Thomas Lubanga. The proceeding itself,
which is authorized by Article 61 of the Rome Statute, is novel,
and there is no real equivalent in the procedure of the earlier international criminal tribunals.108 Ostensibly the purpose is to protect
the defendant against abusive and unfounded accusations.109 At the
confirmation hearing, the Prosecutor is required to support each
charge with sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to
believe that the person committed the crime charged. The Prose-

104

Id. ¶ 109. The sentence might be translated as follows: ‘free and unequivocal
(although it may be implied or express), and informed.’
105
Id. n.220 (citing Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision
on Prosecutor’s Motion for the Admission of Certain Materials under Rule
89(C), ¶¶ 18-19 (Trial Chamber I, Oct. 14, 2004).
106
Id. n.220 (citing Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on
Vidoje Blagojević’s Oral Request, ¶ 8 (Trial Chamber I, July 30, 2004); Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Decision on Motion for Exclusion of
Statement of Accused, ¶¶ 22-23 (Trial Chamber I, July 8, 2005)).
107
Id.
108
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 61(1).
109
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Décision
sur la confirmation des charges, Public Redacted Version with Annex I, ¶ 37
(Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges].
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cutor is entitled to rely on documentary or summary evidence and
need not call the witnesses expected to testify at the trial.110
¶49
Although it confirmed the charges against Lubanga, PreTrial Chamber I criticized the Prosecutor’s first “document containing the charges”111 for not providing a more detailed description of the context in which the alleged crimes had taken place.112
¶50
The confirmation hearing seems to resemble preliminary
hearings held under common law procedure in many jurisdictions.
It allows the Court to ensure that a prosecution is not frivolous and
that there is sufficient evidence for a finding of guilt, thereby protecting the accused from prosecutorial abuse. From the standpoint
of the defendant, it also provides a useful opportunity to be informed of important evidence in the possession of the prosecution
and even to test the value of such evidence, at least in a superficial
way, during a judicial proceeding. Where the Statute is not clear is
in the usefulness of submitting defense evidence during the confirmation hearing. While the Statute invites the defense to present
evidence at this stage, it is not obvious that contradictory evidence
adduced by the defense can have any effect upon the determination
of the existence of ‘sufficient evidence.’ The Pre-Trial Chamber
may well decide that whether or not defense evidence raises doubts
about the validity of Prosecution evidence is a matter for the trial
court and not a pre-trial issue.
¶51
The most dramatic conclusion of the confirmation hearing
was the decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber to add to the charges
against Lubanga. Lubanga was charged with child soldier offenses, which are set out in two provisions of the Rome Statute,
one of which is applicable to international armed conflict and the
other to non-international armed conflict. There are slight differences between the two, but they are broadly similar. Although the
Prosecutor had initially requested issuance of an arrest warrant
with respect to both provisions,113 when he issued formal charges
against Lubanga in August 2006, the provision concerning interna110

Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 61(5).
See id. art. 61(3)(a); Regulations of the Court, adopted on 26 May 2004 by
the Judges of the Court, Fifth Plenary Session, ICC-BD/01-01-04, Chapter 5,
The Hague, 17-28 May 2004, at Reg. 52. In deference to judicial pluralism, the
Rome Statute does not use the term ‘indictment.’
112
Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 109, ¶153.
113
See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for warrant of arrest, Art. 58, Confidential
(Pre-Trial Chamber I, Feb. 10 2006).
111
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tional armed conflict was not invoked.114 The Pre-Trial Chamber
did not see the reason for this, and decided to ‘confirm’ charges
against Lubanga with respect to both international and noninternational armed conflict.
¶52
The Prosecutor objected strenuously, arguing in effect that
the Pre-Trial Chamber had acted ultra vires. Its role under the
Statute, he contended, was to ‘confirm’ charges and not to introduce new ones. By adding new charges to the case, the judges
were unacceptably interfering in matters of prosecutorial discretion.115 The Pre-Trial Chamber denied the Prosecutor’s application
for leave to appeal its decision.116
¶53
The entire proceeding of the confirmation hearing consumed
many months, and undoubtedly delayed the start of the trial,
scheduled for March 31, 2008. When Lubanga’s trial begins, it
will be able to take credit for the longest pre-trial period of any of
the international criminal tribunals dealing with its first case.117
The ICTY started its first trial, of Dusko Tadić, on May 7, 1996,
slightly over a year after the date when he was taken into custody.
The Rwanda Tribunal began its first trial, of Jean-Paul Akeyesu,
on January 9, 1997, less than eight months after the accused had
been brought to Arusha.118 The Special Court for Sierra Leone began its first trial, of the three Civil Defence Forces defendants, on
June 3, 2004, fifteen months after their arrest. The average is
somewhat less than a year. Thus, the ICC, with twenty-five
months from arrest to the beginning of trial, is by far the slowest of
them all, and the confirmation hearing is part of the explanation for
this regrettable situation. Legitimate questions arise about the real
114

See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-356,
Submission of the Document Containing the Charges pursuant to Article
61(3)(a) and of the List of Evidence pursuant to Rule 121(3), Public Document
with Ex Parte, Confidential and Public Annexes, (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Aug. 28,
2006).
115
See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-806,
Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber I's 29 January 2007 « Décision sur la confirmation des charges », Public, ¶¶ 2-3 (Feb. 5, 2007).
116
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-915, Decision on the Prosecution and Defence applications for leave to appeal the Decision on the confirmation of charges, Public, at 21 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, May 24,
2007).
117
See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶ 10,
27 (Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997).
118
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 11, 17 (Trial
Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998).
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utility of this additional pre-trial step, given its cost in terms of
lengthening the overall proceedings. It appears to have added little
or nothing to the knowledge of the evidence by the defense, which
is in any case addressed by the disclosure obligations upon the
Prosecutor. If the Review Conference on the Rome Statute takes a
pragmatic approach, it might decide to eliminate the confirmation
hearing. Alternatively, it might attempt to circumscribe the scope
of the hearing so that it does not take many months of preparation,
weeks of hearing time, and two months for the drafting of a
lengthy decision.
VII.
¶54

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A decade ago, an essay on significant developments over the
previous twelve months in international criminal prosecutions
would have been a modest affair. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had entered its first conviction
following a contested trial.119 Its Appeals Chamber had issued two
interlocutory decisions, although the results were not very well received by the international community, and they were effectively
overturned by provisions of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, adopted the following July.120 The Rwanda Tribunal had yet to render any judgment on the merits, and its only
significant case law for 1997 consisted of an interlocutory ruling
on jurisdiction that largely echoed the famous Tadić decision of the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia.121 Neither the International Criminal Court nor
the Special Court for Sierra Leone existed at the time.

119

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Trial
Chamber, May 7, 1997).
120
See generally Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate
Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah (Oct. 7, 1997) (whose conclusion that the defense of duress was unavailable in the case of crimes against humanity was rejected by the Rome Conference, see Rome Statute, supra note 2,
art. 31(1)(d)); see also Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108bis,
Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision
of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (Appeals Chamber, Oct. 29, 1997) (whose
conclusion that the international tribunal would be the ultimate arbiter in cases
where states invoked national security concerns as a reason for not cooperating
was rejected by the Rome Conference, see Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 72).
121
Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on the Defence
Motion on Jurisdiction, ¶ 27 (Trial Chamber II, June 18, 1997)
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Ten years later, the volume of case law is enormous. The
Sierra Leone Special Court alone in 2007 accounted for two massive judgments, totaling more than 1,000 pages. This article has
thus necessarily addressed only a selection of the important findings of the Tribunals in the course of 2007. Other points of considerable interest include: the rejection of the concept of ‘forced
marriage’ as an autonomous category of crimes against humanity;122 rulings clarifying the extent of victim participation in proceedings before the International Criminal Court;123 an order by a
Trial Chamber that a sum of money be paid to a defendant in compensation for procedural abuses;124 payment of defense costs for a
self-represented accused;125 whether the Appeals Chamber has the
authority to reopen proceedings after a final judgment has been
issued;126 conviction and sentencing to a term of imprisonment of a
witness for contempt of court;127 a narrow construction of crimes
against humanity by which combatants including those hors de
combat are not encompassed within the expression ‘civilian population;’128 a finding that a non-guided high dispersion missile, the
M-87 Orkan, that was incapable of hitting specific targets by virtue
of its characteristics and the firing range in the specific instance,
122

See Brima Trial Judgment, supra note 27, ¶¶ 702-707; see also id., Partly
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Doherty on Count 7 (Sexual Slavery) and Count 8
(‘Forced Marriages’).
123
See Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-101, Decision on Victims’
Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to
1/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Public Redacted Version (Pre-Trial
Chamber II, Aug. 10, 2007); Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC02/05-110, Decision on the Requests of the OPCD on the Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the Regulations of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the Prosecutor, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Dec. 3, 2007).
124
Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44C-T, Decision on Appropriate Remedy, at 23 (Trial Chamber III, Jan. 31, 2007), aff’d, Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba Case No. ICTR-98-44C-A, Decision on Appeal against Decision on
Appropriate Remedy, ¶ 31 (Appeals Chamber, Sept. 13, 2007).
125
See generally Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, Decision on Implementing the Financing of the Accused (Trial Chamber III, Oct. 30, 2007).
126
See generally Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-Misc.1, Decision on
Strugar’s Request to Reopen Appeal Proceedings (Appeals Chamber, June 7,
2007).
127
Prosecutor v. GAA, Case No. ICTR-07-90-R77-I, Judgment and Sentence, at
6 (Trial Chamber III, Dec. 4 2007).
128
See Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 461 (Trial
Chamber II, Sept. 27, 2007); see also Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-0414-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 693-694 (Trial Chamber I, Aug. 2, 2007).
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was an indiscriminate weapon;129 and the suggestion that shelling a
city might constitute a lawful reprisal (although rejected in the specific circumstances of the case).130
¶56
This body of law is now probably the most dynamic area in
public international law. In addition to the work of the ad hoc tribunals, important rulings and legal developments with respect to
both substantive and procedural law have taken place before specialized ‘hybrid’ institutions, like the Extraordinary Chambers of
the Courts of Cambodia, and exclusively national courts. The
richness of accumulated experience and the increasing advocacy
skills of practitioners manifest themselves in submissions of both
prosecution and defense, not to mention the abundant case law.
¶57
International criminal justice is a costly business. All of this
activity would not take place without the commitments of governments to the funding of the institutions, as well as to investments
within their own domestic justice systems. To this extent, the continued existence and growth of international criminal justice crimes
is dependent upon political decisions, which are in turn dependent
upon the support of the populace. At present, this shows no signs
of flagging. In order to maintain this support, international justice
will have to continue to demonstrate serious and credible results
that contribute both to accountability for atrocities and also to the
promotion of peace and social stability.

129

Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶ 463 (Trial Chamber
I, June 12, 2007).
130
Id. ¶ 468.

